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 As China prepares to embark on their treacherous road to democracy and 
international superiority, the current administration within the Chinese government 
understands that they will be forced to handle numerous contentious issues.  These 
obstacles may include domestic political strife, human rights debates, air-pollution 
remedies, over-populated cities, the hukou system, and much more.  However, another 
situation may prove to be even more difficult to solve than any of these aforementioned 
predicaments, and could shape China’s future status in the world depending on its 
outcome.  The circumstance that I am referring to is that of a nuclear Democratic 
People’s Republic of Korea.  More specifically, the precarious position that a nuclear 
North Korea forces China into.  This situation is extremely difficult because it comes 
down to a simple decision regarding whether or not China will continue to support their 
longtime ally, even though their relationship with North Korea has begun to hinder 
China’s credibility around the globe.   
As it currently stands, there are many different perspectives regarding this specific 
decision that China’s Politburo must face in the near future.  While the perspectives come 
in all different forms, and with varying theories and suggestions, the two ends of the 
spectrum have started to solidify themselves.  One side argues that the threat of North 
Korea is both imminent and extremely serious.  Therefore, this faction would endorse a 
more aggressive approach, and would call for immediate action.  These actions could be 
strategic economic and trade sanctions, but may also include military behavior.  The 
other position suggests that while North Korea may seem like a military threat, in 
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actuality, overly aggressive actions would bring about the worst possible results for all 
parties concerned.  Therefore, this camp would advocate for letting the DPRK run its 
course.  They would project that due to the DPRK’s infrastructure deficiencies and 
economic struggles, their demise or reformation would occur much before a North 
Korean attack could materialize.  
For this paper, I have put myself in the position of The Communist Party of 
China’s General Secretary, Xi Jinping.  By doing this, I have been able to come up with 
my own perspective on this dilemma.  As a result, I have also been able to produce a 
suggestion to Beijing on how to handle this extremely complicated situation.  In order to 
ensure that my proposition is both pragmatic and possible, I have analyzed the history of 
the Sino-DPRK relationship, as well as dissected the many different opinions presented 
by the academic and media communities.  I hope that the general public will be able to 
use this research in order to gain a deeper understanding of the Sino-North Korean 
relationship.  Additionally, I hope that my findings will be able to assist those interested 
in the subject in producing a thought-out and strategic plan that could finally de-





China has successfully completed the first stages of its remarkable journey from 
an autarkic country, fraught with poverty and a depleted infrastructure, to Asia’s most 
dominant nation and the world’s second largest economy.  Along this journey, the 
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Chinese political climate and philosophy has changed from a closed-off communist 
regime, to a nation that has tied itself to the global financial system and created its own 
stock markets.  While making this transition, China has allowed itself to develop new 
relationships with countries that live under varying political and economic systems.  Even 
those countries that wouldn’t have considered interacting with China during the Maoist 
era have begun to form political and economic relations with China.  
Historically plagued by years of warring feudal kings, dynastic clashes, and 
invasions from the north and east, China has lived through many stages of domestic and 
international political strife.  However difficult and unpredictable China’s different 
political relationships have been in the past, few have been as relentless, erratic, and 
painful as the one that currently exists between The Peoples Republic of China (PRC) 
and The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK).   
As a result of China’s well-chronicled allegiance with North Korea, China has 
perpetually been forced into precarious, and sometimes unwinnable situations.  While 
this constant defense of North Korea by Beijing is expected, China has become frustrated 
with having to repeatedly support the somewhat-renegade actions of North Korea.  Now 
that China has shifted away from its previous Maoist ideologies, and have started to 
embrace globalization and reform as their path to a successful future, the Sino-North 
Korean alliance has wavered.  Furthermore, the United Nations (UN), and specifically the 
United States, has started to put pressure on China to leverage their influence within the 
Korean peninsula in order to contain the North Korean government and reign in their 
unpredictable activity.  China is currently North Korea’s only secure lifeline to the 
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outside world and is currently the DPRK’s number one trading partner1.  This fact 
suggests that if China were to acquiesce to Western countries’ requests to cut off this 
economic aid, it would undoubtedly drive the country into widespread famine and lead to 
a collapse of the regime.   
From China’s standpoint, the decision to enforce these sanctions on the DPRK 
isn’t as clear-cut as one may initially believe.  On the contrary, many academics and 
government officials throughout China argue that aiding North Korea is important in 
order to avoid “compromising its own long-standing interests in regional stability and the 
maintenance of a China-friendly peninsula”2.  Throughout this paper, I will recount the 
initial emergence of the Chinese-North Korean political friendship and military alliance, 
and exhibit the effect that China’s ideological divergence has had on their relationship.  I 
will conclude my thesis by detailing the current state of the relationship, and specifically 
how China is handling the aforementioned decisions regarding whether or not to retain 
ties with North Korea, or to fully emerge as a western ally and allow the DPRK to be 
swallowed up by the U.S.-allied, South Korea. 
 
The Korean War 
 
 The end of World War II in 1945 signified a victory for the Allies who primarily 
consisted of The United States, Russia and Great Britain, over the Axis who were 
comprised of Germany, Italy, and Japan.  This conquest represented a large shift in the 
                                                
1 Samuel S. Kim, North Korean Foreign Relations in the Post-Cold War Era, p. 191, 
Table 9.2 
2 Scott Snyder, China’s Rise and the Two Koreas, p. 149 
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way that the world was divided; Europe was split up amongst the victors.  Specifically, 
western countries were allowed to return to pre-war sovereignty, while the USSR was 
given influence within the eastern portion.  Additionally, The United Nations was created 
as an international instrument intended to help prevent conflicts from mounting into 
World Wars.  While this division of previously Axis-occupied land was taking place in 
the western hemisphere, the same activity was being performed in the east.  The 
previously Japanese-occupied Korean peninsula was split up at the 38th parallel.  The 
northern half was allotted to the USSR and deemed socialist.  This portion of the 
peninsula eventually blossomed into the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.  In 
contrast, the region south of the 38th parallel was left to the United States, and ultimately 
became the Republic of Korea (ROK)3. 
As this rampant partitioning was transpiring throughout the globe, China was 
engulfed in a division of its own.  This discord was a civil war between Mao Zedong’s 
Communist Party, and Chiang Kai-shek’s nationalist Kuomintang (KMT) party.  
Although the two sides agreed to a truce in order to fend off the Japanese invasions prior 
to the civil war, the nationalists and the communists had a long-standing hatred towards 
each other, and their differing political views didn’t help mend the disagreement.  After 
the Japanese threat was thwarted, internal fighting resumed.  In 1949, Mao and his troops 
drove Chiang Kai-shek and the rest of the KMT to Taiwan, which was officially known 
as the Republic of China (ROC)4.  During the civil war, Mao’s distaste for the Americans 
was ignited because the KMT was backed throughout the fighting by the United States.  
Moreover, due to the difference on fundamental political principles, this feeling of 
                                                
3 Don Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History 
4 Jian Chen, China’s Road to the Korean War 
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animosity towards the U.S. was continued after the war had concluded.5  While the KMT 
was aided by the west, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) was supported by North 
Korea throughout the war.  Thus, when victory was achieved, Mao was indebted to the 
DPRK.  After the expulsion of the KMT from China, peace finally emerged in East Asia, 
and gave all the victorious nations a chance to regroup after a strenuous period of battle.  
Japan had been defeated, and Russia, China and the United States each had their own 
section of East Asian to mold as they saw fit.  This calm, however, wouldn’t last for an 
extended period of time.  
 The communist-socialist vs. democratic-capitalist governing style has long been a 
contentious topic throughout history.  When the Korean peninsula was split up at the 
close of World War II, and one segment was specified as communist, and the other 
stipulated as more right wing, tensions were bound to arise.  While reunification 
negotiations discussions began to surface in the late 1940s, the tension between the two 
sides was steadily increasing, and ultimately resulted in the Northern communists 
invading the southern region and officially sparking the start of the Korean War in 19506.  
Although most historians believe that this is how the Korean War originally began, some 
academics, such as professor Bruce Cummings from the University of Chicago argue that 
it isn’t clear who first invaded whom, and what actually sparked the war.  Regardless of 
how the war began, as soon as it did officially start, the United States (with the support of 
the United Nations) went in to defend the south.  General MacArthur and the U.S. troops 
were easily able to fend off the North’s incursion into the south, and were able to regain 
control of Seoul, the capital of the region south of the 38th parallel.  However, the U.S. 
                                                
5 Paul M. Edwards, Historical Dictionary of the Korean War 
6 Paul M. Edwards, Historical Dictionary of the Korean War 
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did not cease fighting once they were able to secure and stabilize South Korea.  Rather, 
the U.S. troops attacked, and were sent north of the 38th parallel, and ultimately drove the 
North Korean army into the northern most regions of the peninsula, encroaching on 
China’s border. 
 As U.S. troops advanced further and further north into the Korean peninsula, Mao 
and his newly unified People’s Republic of China had a choice to make.  They could let 
the USSR-backed north fight against the U.S.-backed south, and let those nations control 
the destiny of the Korean peninsula.  On the other hand, China could repay their debts to 
North Korea for helping China defeat the nationalist party, and intervene on the DPRK’s 
behalf.  While it is clear that China does eventually decide to cross the Yalu River, (the 
small river that separates China and North Korea) and joined the North Koreans to fight 
against the Americans, the reason behind Mao’s decision is something that is still 
debated. 
 In Allen Whiting’s book, “China Crosses the Yalu”, published in 1960, Whiting 
concludes that because of the U.S. and United Nation’s attack deep into North Korea, 
China had no choice but to assist the Soviet and North Korean troops in order to both 
defend the northern section of the Korean peninsula, but also protect against the possible 
infiltration from the western forces into Chinese and Soviet territory7.  While this is 
undoubtedly an important reason why China felt compelled to enter the Korean War, it is 
not the main rationale in Mao’s final decision to cross the Yalu River.  As we learn from 
more recent iterations chronicling the PRC’s support of the DPRK during the Korean 
War, the main motive that compelled Mao to fully support North Korea was his anti-
                                                
7 Allen S. Whiting, China Crosses the Yalu 
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imperialist mission, and the idea of obliterating the U.S. forces on their border was too 
attractive to ignore.  One of the authors of these books, Shu Guangzhang, acknowledges 
Whiting’s assumption.  He states, “Whiting argues that the CCP leadership merely 
responded to what seemed an unambiguous, compelling threat to its security”8.   
However, he eventually sides with Chen Jian, another author and historian who 
researched China’s decision to enter the war.  “Chen asserts, they (China) were deluded 
into thinking more about opportunity than danger in dealing with the Korean Crisis”9.  
The opportunity that Chen alludes to is the possibility of creating a fully communist Asia, 
and driving out the imperialist powers once and for all10.   
      Even though China wanted to eliminate U.S. and UN forces from the region, they 
were severely overmatched when it came to technology and weaponry.  However, this 
obstacle didn’t seem to faze Mao when it came to his decision-making.  “Shaped by 
communist ideology, as well as Chinese political culture and military history, Mao’s 
belief in human superiority over technological superiority suggested his romantic attitude 
toward the threat and use of force”11.  Mao wrote specifically on this matter, “Weapons 
are an important factor in a war, but not the decisive factor, it is people, not things, that 
are decisive”12.  This thought process proves that while the imminent threat of U.S. 
troops knocking on China’s door, just directly south of China’s Liaoning province, was a 
                                                
8 Shu Guang Zhang, Mao’s Military Romanticism – China and the Korean War, 1950-
1953, p. 3 
9 Shu Guang Zhang, Mao’s Military Romanticism – China and the Korean War, 1950-
1953, p. 8 
10 Chen Jian, China’s Road to the Korean War 
11 Shu Guang Zhang, Mao’s Military Romanticism – China and the Korean War, 1950-
1953, p. 11 
12 Shu Guang Zhang, Mao’s Military Romanticism – China and the Korean War, 1950-
1953, p. 11 
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major factor in Mao’s decision to enter the war, it turns out that it was his revolutionary 
frame of mind, and confidence in China’s ideological superiority over the imperialists, 
that finally led him to cross the Yalu river, and join the North Korean forces in 1950.13 
 After three long and bloody years of fighting, North Korea and the communist 
Chinese forces agreed to sign a cease-fire Armistice Agreement with the United Nations 
and the United States on July 27th, 195314.  While this armistice was finally agreed upon 
and resulted in the 38th parallel re-drawn, the war was never, and has never been 
officially proclaimed over.  However, in the minds of the North Koreans, as well as the 
Chinese, the communists prevailed victorious in the Korean War, and were able to 
successfully drive out the U.S. “imperialists”.  It is because of this great victory over the 
west that strengthened the already strong relationship between Mao and the People’s 
Republic of China, and Kim Il Sung and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea. 
 Since the Korean War, this unique bond between the DPRK and the PRC has 
remained seemingly secure throughout all the different political dilemmas. Premier Zhou 
Enlai of China explained the inexplicably strong alliance between China and North Korea 
by stating,  
China and Korea are neighbors linked by mountains and rivers.  There exists a traditional        
militant friendship between the Chinese and Korean peoples.  This friendship cemented in blood 
was forged and has grown in the course of a protracted struggle against our common enemies, US 
and Japanese imperialism. The militant friendship between the Chinese and Korean peoples is the 
embodiment of the intimate relationships of our two peoples who share weal and woe and are as 
closely linked as lips to teeth.  Common interests and common problems of security have bound 
and united our two peoples together.15 
  
This excerpt from Premier Zhou Enlai shows how strongly the Chinese government feels 
about the relationship between the two countries.  Moreover, he noted that in addition to 
                                                
13 Paul M. Edwards, Historical Dictionary of the Korean War 
14 Paul M. Edwards, Historical Dictionary of the Korean War 
15 Samuel S. Kim, North Korean Foreign Relations in the Post-Cold War Era, p. 95 
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a militant relationship that was “cemented in blood” during the Korean War, the reason 
behind the two countries having an even deeper connection is because of their common 
interests.   
There are two common interests that he is alluding to throughout his speech: their 
shared disdain for the US and Japanese imperialists and the North Korean and Chinese 
belief in a similar political ideology.  Both Mao and Kim Il Sung both believed in a type 
of Marxist-Leninist socialist structure in order to sufficiently govern their people.  
Moreover, these two leaders both believed in altering their philosophy to adapt to their 
people and specific political situation as best they could.  It is this type of finagling that 
allowed China to shift from Maoist socialism to Deng Xiaoping’s “Socialism with 
Chinese Characteristics” in the late 1980s16.  Before Deng rose to power, both Mao and 
Kim Il Sung believed that the only way to fully indoctrinate their people was to create a 
socialist country based off of self-reliance and political independence.   
In the DPRK this specific philosophy was known as juche.  Juche is widely 
accepted as the key term when trying to grasp the philosophical outlook in all areas of life 
in DPRK17.  Translated as self-reliance, juche has been the philosophical theory that has 
been supported since 1950, but it wasn’t until 1972 when it was put in the DPRK 
constitution as the “guiding principle of politics”18.  Mao had an almost identical 
philosophy that was perpetuated throughout China starting in 1945.  This philosophical 
idea was called, zili gengsheng.  This slogan is also translated as “self-reliance”, and Mao 
supported this theory whole-heartedly.  He advertised to his party saying, “We stand for 
                                                
16 Scott Snyder, China’s Rise and the Two Koreas, p. 149 
17 Samuel S. Kim, North Korean Foreign Relations in the Post-Cold War Era, p. 33 
18 Samuel S. Kim, North Korean Foreign Relations in the Post-Cold War Era, p. 33 
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self-reliance.  We depend on our own efforts, on the creative power of the whole army 
and the entire people”19.  While the rest of the world was globalizing, and connecting 
with foreign countries to bridge cultural and economic gaps, both China and North Korea 
wanted to focus on building their empires internally as best they could, with little 
assistance from the rest of the world.  It is because of this shared philosophy, and their 
hatred of the US that brought these two nations into a bond that has been characterized as 
“sealed in the fresh blood”20.  Kim Il Sung echoed Zhou Enlai’s previous description of 
the link between the North Korean and Chinese peoples.  He remarked,  
We are very pleased with the invariable, continued development of the great Korea-China 
friendship, which has a historical tradition.  Korea-China friendship is an invincible one that no 
force can ever break.  It will further flourish down through generations.  It will last as long as the 
mountains and rivers to the two countries exist.21 
 
These two powerful leaders’ quotes about the relationship between the two Asian 
autarkies demonstrate how secure this relationship once was.  However, as time has 
passed since the Chinese crossed the Yalu to defend the North Koreans and drive the 
imperialists back across the 38th parallel, the relationship has had to withstand many 
instances of tension and pressure.   
 
A Friendship Ignited 
 
 Since the Korean War came to an unofficial close in 1953 with the signed 
Armistice Agreement, not only has the DPRK had friendly relations with the Chinese, but 
it has also maintained a strong alliance with the Soviets.  This three-way communist 
                                                
19 Henry Yuhuai He, Dictionary of the Political Thought of the People’s Republic of 
China, p. 682 
20 Samuel S. Kim, North Korean Foreign Relations in the Post-Cold War Era, p. 94 
21 Samuel S. Kim, North Korean Foreign Relations in the Post-Cold War Era, p. 95 
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consortium was made official in July 1961 when the Soviet Union, China, and the DPRK 
all agreed to sign the Treaty of Defense and Mutual Assistance22.  Additionally, at the 
close of the Korean War, Kim Il Sung went to Beijing and signed an agreement in order 
to secure a grant of 800 million RMB (approx. USD 125 million) in order to help bolster 
the crippled North Korean economy, and nullify all of the DPRK’s debts to China that 
they accumulated during the Korean War.  By 1976 it is estimated that North Korea had 
received USD 967 million in grants and loans from China, and USD 1,534 million from 
the USSR23.  The treaty and the economic cooperation solidified the communist 
partnership, but this alliance, like any, wasn’t void of hiccups.   
As the Cold War between the USSR and the US pressed on, China began to move 
away from the zili gengsheng philosophy that Mao had made the standard practice, and 
began to look outside of its borders in order globalize, modernize, and most importantly, 
pull itself out of poverty.  Mao’s “Great Leap Forward” and “Cultural Revolution” were 
performed with this type of zili gengsheng in mind, but instead of building a powerful 
and stable country, it produced widespread famine, corruption, nepotism, and death24.      
Because of these atrocities brought upon China by its close-minded leadership, 
China knew it had to make a change.  The first significant change came about when 
China agreed to normalize relations with the United States by “ending hostilities that had 
existed between them since the start of the Korean War”25.  This shift was a huge change 
from the previous era.  This agreement to normalize relations with the U.S. showed both 
the USSR and the DPRK that the Chinese were beginning to open their doors and begin 
                                                
22 Samuel S. Kim, North Korean Foreign Relations in the Post-Cold War Era, p. 95 
23 Samuel S. Kim, North Korean Foreign Relations in the Post-Cold War Era, p. 106 
24 Scott Snyder, China’s Rise and the Two Koreas, p. 149 
25 Samuel S. Kim, North Korean Foreign Relations in the Post-Cold War Era, p. 96 
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relations with other countries outside of their previously arranged socialist conglomerate.  
While Pyongyang wasn’t ready to turn on China, this was the first step in creating the 
type of Sino-DPRK tensions that exist today. 
 After China and the United States normalized their relations in the early 1970s, 
the Cold War grew tenser as the years passed.  Throughout this time, North Korea 
remained reliant on the friendship to the Soviet Union and, to a lesser extent, China, to 
help aid their country.  However, as the USSR felt the end of its socialist empire 
collapsing around them, they decided to normalize relations with China in 1989 just as 
Deng Xiaoping was allowing China to enter the international marketplace and prosper 
economically.  This normalization, and the successive disintegration of the USSR in 1991 
forced Pyongyang into a difficult position.   
First off, the DPRK could no longer rely on a dismantled Soviet Union to provide 
a security blanket for their section of the Korean Peninsula.  Secondly, the USSR ceased 
their economic assistance to North Korea in 1990 following the normalization of its 
diplomatic relations with South Korea, so this hurt North Korea economically26.  Lastly, 
the DPRK was weary of the Chinese who were gradually moving away from the shared 
Marxist-Leninist ideology and were starting to transform economically and politically.  
Therefore, North Korea began to feel relatively isolated.  Instead of following the 
examples that China nicely laid out for the DPRK, Kim Jung Il decided not to open up his 
country, but rather to reinforce their juche philosophy.  In his speech titled “Our 
Socialism Centered on the Masses Shall Not Perish”, Kim Jung Il said, “The prevailing 
complex situation requires that we should maintain the juche stand still more firmly in the 
                                                
26 Samuel S. Kim, North Korean Foreign Relations in the Post-Cold War Era, p. 106 
 15 
revolution and construction”27.  This is an important period in the history of North Korea, 
and particularly in the relationship that has existed between the Chinese and the North 
Koreans. 
 
A Change in Leadership 
 
As Kim Il Sung grew older, he began to groom his son, Kim Jung Il, to take over 
in power and assume control of the North Korean regime.  As early as the 1970s it 
became apparent that this hereditary succession was Kim Il Sung’s plan.  Samuel S. Kim 
asserts that, “by 1980 Kim Jun Il was officially designated as his father’s successor”28.  
This indication was a cause for concern for the Chinese, especially due to the fact that the 
younger Kim lacked the type of guanxi (translated in Mandarin as “relationships” and 
“connections”), that his father wielded with ease.  This guanxi allowed Kim Il Sung to 
masterfully facilitate relations with many of the top Chinese leaders, such as Mao 
Zedong, Zhou Enlai and even Deng Xiaoping.  Kim Jung Il’s lack of Chinese guanxi 
(connections with the Chinese leadership) wouldn’t have hurt him as much if the Chinese 
didn’t have to give their official endorsement on Kim Jung Il’s rise to power.  While the 
elder Kim was in power, he focused on North Korean foreign policy and international 
relations.  Meanwhile, Kim Jung Il was left to administer the domestic politics and 
situations that erupted throughout the nation.  This left the North Koreans with a positive 
feeling about the younger Kim, but because there hadn’t been a heredity succession 
                                                
27 Samuel S. Kim, North Korean Foreign Relations in the Post-Cold War Era, p. 97 
28 Samuel S. Kim, North Korean Foreign Relations in the Post-Cold War Era, p. 101 
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within the communist nations since the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917, the Chinese were 
more apprehensive of the soon-to-be new leader of North Korea, Kim Jung Il29. 
In order to combat this problem, in 1983 Kim Jung Il chose to make his first trip 
outside of North Korea, and the country of his choice was China.  During his trip he met 
with many of China’s top officials, including Deng Xiaoping, Zhao Ziyang (State 
Council Premier) and many other members of the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) 
Politburo.  Throughout his trip, he consistently remarked and reiterated how strong the 
bond between the two nations was.  Kim Jung Il said, 
It has now become a tradition for the Chinese and Korean leaders to meet and exchange views as 
if they were real brothers since we don’t have to follow the formalities of diplomatic protocol.  It 
is not because we are geographic neigbours but because our minds are united by a close friendship 
and our mutual trust is truly profound.  Our two countries and peoples have shed so much blood 
and sacrificed so many lives for the great tasks and mutual interests of the two countries that the 
friendship, which has been sealed in fresh blood, shall never change.30 
 
This obvious loyalty that Kim Jung Il reserved for China, won over government officials 
during his first trip to China, and he received their endorsement to lead the next 
generation of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.   
 In addition to exchanging pleasantries with the distinguished members of the 
CCP’s Politburo, and reemphasizing the strength of Sino-North Korean relations, Kim 
Jung Il spent the majority of his trip to China studying their open economic policy, which 
led to North Korea’s establishment of the Joint Venture Law31.  After the implementation 
of this North Korean open economic policy, Kim Jung Il used massive investments from 
China and Japan to help modernize North Korea’s limited infrastructure.  In the 1980s, it 
was estimated that China had USD 40 million invested in joint venture enterprises within 
                                                
29 Samuel S. Kim, North Korean Foreign Relations in the Post-Cold War Era, p. 101 
30 Samuel S. Kim, North Korean Foreign Relations in the Post-Cold War Era, p. 102 
31 Samuel S. Kim, North Korean Foreign Relations in the Post-Cold War Era, p. 104 
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the DPRK32.  After Kim Jung Il’s recent death, Kim Jung Un, his son, claimed the throne 
and has continued to build off of the framework set forth by his father and grandfather, 




 Beginning with China’s agreement to terminate North Korea’s debt following the 
Korean War, North Korea and China have expanded their relationship from purely 
militant, to trade allies as well.  Because China’s open economic policy reform gained 
more interest, and thus capital, from the western nations, they were able to grow rapidly.  
However, North Korea was not as lucky when they attempted to open up to allow foreign 
investments.  This lack of foreign capital from across the globe, paired with the stoppage 
of Soviet contributions after the collapse of the USSR, made North Korea extremely 
vulnerable and especially reliant on China.  Specifically, North Korea needed crude oil 
from China in order to keep the state running.  China had a plethora of oil, and due to 
their storied partnership, the fact that China had recently normalized relations with South 
Korea (1992), and coupled with China’s fear of North Korea falling to an imperialist-
allied South Korea, China agreed to export their crude oil to the DPRK at a cheap 
‘friendship’ price of USD 4.50 per barrel in order to stabilize North Korea and to restore 
faith in the Sino-North Korean partnership33.   
In addition to crude oil, China also supplied grain to North Korea, because grain 
is necessary to help sustain the population.  In 2005 it was recorded that China exported a 
                                                
32 Samuel S. Kim, North Korean Foreign Relations in the Post-Cold War Era, p. 105 
33 Samuel S. Kim, North Korean Foreign Relations in the Post-Cold War Era, p. 106 
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whopping USD 273 million worth of oil, and USD 78 million worth of grain.  In total, 
China exported a little more than a billion US dollars worth of trade to the DPRK in 
200534.  These statistics show how completely reliant North Korea is on the Chinese 
economic assistance that China has continually provided since the end of the Korean 
War.  Snyder analyzes the situation by saying, “Despite China’s desire to put the 
relationship onto a more market-oriented basis, it continued to aid and trade with North 
Korea in an effort to forestall the latter’s collapse and to keep refuges from flowing into 
China at the height of the famine”35.  Snyder goes on to show, “that approved Chinese 
investments in North Korea doubled from $67 million for nineteen projects during the 
first ten months of 2005, to $135 million for forty-nine projects through October 2006.36   
These trade statistics clearly exhibit how the economic reliance and overall 
assistance provided by China to North Korea has not slowed down.  Rather, it has turned 
up even more as the DPRK digs itself deeper into a hole with the remainder of the world, 
and thus must continually turn to China for support.  Despite the burden that this constant 
outflow of goods from China to North Korea may put on China, especially as it tries to 
navigate its way to economic superiority, China still believes their aid to be “‘strategic’ in 
nature”, because they are fully convinced that if they withdraw their assistance, then 
North Korea may collapse due to political instability or an economic crisis37.   
While it is well documented how much economic aid China provides to North 
Korea, (estimated $6 billion in trade in 2011) it is less understood how China can 
simultaneously gain economically from North Korea.  This gain comes from the amount 
                                                
34 Scott Snyder, China’s Rise and the Two Koreas, p. 115, Table 5.3 
35 Scott Snyder, China’s Rise and the Two Koreas, p. 115 
36 Scott Snyder, China’s Rise and the Two Koreas, p. 117 
37 Scott Snyder, China’s Rise and the Two Koreas, p. 112 
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of Chinese investment that is currently invested inside the DPRK, specifically related to 
mineral resource development within North Korea’s northern region38.   
Apart from the “steel, cement, minerals, and marine products”39 that are exported 
from North Korea to China and the minimal Chinese investment within the DPRK, these 
statistics, analyses, and excerpts show that the Chinese government only continues this 
support to the DPRK in order to stabilize the longstanding Sino-North Korean 
relationship, and also to make sure that the Korean peninsula, which borders China, 
remains a friendly territory.  Because of the threat that the DPRK poses to the western 
world, The United States and South Korea (as well as the United Nations) have started to 
pressure China to leverage its economic aid in order to achieve global political goals of a 
North Korean regime transformation40.  This pressure has most notably come from the 
UN insisting that the Chinese agree to the sanctions imposed upon the DPRK by the UN.  
In addition to the economic dilemma that currently exists for the Chinese government, 
there is one other activity that North Korea constantly (and illegally) partakes in that 
continually irks China, and that is the building of its nuclear weapons program. 
 
The Nuclear Crisis 
 
 North Korea has been abandoned by the majority of the world, and is 
unquestionably supported solely by China in order to strategically secure the Korean 
peninsula as a buffer between China and the western-allied nations.  Since the 1950s, 
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39 Samuel S. Kim, North Korean Foreign Relations in the Post-Cold War Era, p. 108 
40 Scott Snyder, China’s Rise and the Two Koreas, p. 110 
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North Korea has conducted itself on the philosophy of being self-reliant, and that meant 
being able and ready to defend itself against all attackers.  Because of this, the DPRK has 
constructed their nation by allowing their domestic politics to ere on draconian, and have 
built up a reputation of neglecting human rights laws and UN sanctions.  This is why, in 
the late 1950’s, North Korea decided to enlist the Soviet’s help in order to learn about 
nuclear physics, and then prepared to develop its own nuclear weapons program41.   
Christoph Bluth explains that the idea to pursue nuclear weapons was decided 
both after the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962 (Kim Il Sung declared a new self-reliant 
military policy), and after the United States installed nuclear weapons in the Republic of 
Korea (South Korea).  Due to these two occurrences, it is estimated that somewhere 
between 1966-67 Kim Il Sung gave the order to begin the development of their nuclear 
weapons program42.   
As time passed, North Korea’s nuclear weapons program has gradually increased 
and improved.  However, just as their program was about to grow even further, the 
DPRK encountered a fiscal obstacle.  North Korea was unable to pay the Soviet Union 
for four light water reactors, and thus couldn’t continue to develop their nuclear weapons.  
Therefore, the DPRK had no choice but to reluctantly sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation 
Treaty (NPT) on December 12th, 198543.     
Since the signing of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, there have been many 
more instances of instability.  Many of these crises have arisen due to North Korean 
threats, which cite their possible withdrawal from the NPT.  The first withdrawal resulted 
                                                
41 Christoph Bluth, Crisis on the Korean Peninsula, p.111 
42 Christoph Bluth, Crisis on the Korean Peninsula, p.112 
43 Christoph Bluth, Crisis on the Korean Peninsula, p.114 
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in the implementation of the six-party talks between Russia, China, Japan, The United 
States, South Korea and North Korea.  The six-party talks were convened in order to 
denuclearize the Korean peninsula, and provide guidelines on how North Korea can 
conduct its international trade, as well as how to peacefully use its remaining nuclear 
energy.  While the DPRK’s threat to withdraw from the NPT in 2003 raised tensions to 
an uneasy level, no North Korean actions have been as frightening to the western world, 
or provoked as strong a response, as the three nuclear tests that North Korea has 
performed within the past decade.   
The first of nuclear test was launched on October 9th, 200644.  This test 
sufficiently rocked the western world, and prompted the United Nations to impose strict 
sanctions upon the DPRK.  These sanctions were assembled by the UN and issued under 
the “U.N. Resolution 1718”45.  These restrictions included prohibiting North Korea from 
testing more nuclear weapons, and launching ballistic missiles.  The DPRK also incurred 
trade sanctions from this UN Resolution.  The North Koreans could no longer import or 
export any type of material that could be tied to the building and development of military 
operations or nuclear weapons.  Additionally, North Korea could no longer import luxury 
items into its country.  Lastly, the resolution forced North Korea to re-enter into the six-
party talks that were established in 2003.  While these sanctions were strict enough to 
curb North Korea’s nuclear development for a short time, they could not prevent North 
Korea from continuing its’ quest for functioning nuclear weapons.   
The creation of this initial resolution, while it obviously did not accomplish what 
it set out to rectify, signified a huge shift in China’s foreign policy towards North Korea. 




China not only signed off on the sanctions (after a time of domestic deliberation and 
pressure put on by the UN), but also publicly criticized the North Korean’s actions46.   
These sanctions and criticisms may have alarmed the DPRK government, and 
caused concern throughout their administration due to the strained Sino-DPRK relations, 
but it did not stop their nuclear mission.  Therefore, in 2009 North Korea conducted a 
second test.  This test again prompted a swift and harsh response from the United Nations 
Security Council, and it subsequently implemented the UN Security Council Resolution 
187447.  This resolution was based around the same parameters as the 2006 resolution, 
but this time it was even more stringent with regards to trade and military imports.  
Again, China supported the UN’s decision to implement these sanctions and voted in 
favor of the newest iteration of the resolution (this time with less internal deliberation).                
These resolutions may have severely impacted North Korean international trade, 
but it didn’t prevent the DPRK from again being persistent in achieving their goal of 
producing battle-ready nuclear weapons.  Subsequently, on February 12th 2003, North 
Korea orchestrated their third nuclear test.  This third, and most recent test, has provoked 
Beijing even further, and “experts say that China’s patience with its ally may be wearing 
thin…and the tests could worsen relations and many have urged China’s new leadership 
to consider taking a tougher stance with its neighbor48.  Beijing immediately reacted this 
past February’s test, and “summoned the North Korean ambassador to its foreign 
ministry to protest Pyongyang’s third nuclear test”49.   






These reactions and news reports highlight China’s disapproval of North Korea’s 
nuclear program.  As a result, China has started to put in place measures in order to 
combat and control the DPRK’s destructive actions.  However, Council on Foreign 
Relations Senior Fellow, Adam Segal, believes that China completely stopping or 
withdrawing its support of the DPRK is unrealistic.  He remarks, “The idea that the 
Chinese would turn their backs on the North Koreans is clearly wrong”50.  This theory of 
continued Chinese support for the North Koreans is due to the fact that “Pyongyang 
ensures a friendly nation on its northeastern border, and provides a buffer zone between 
China and democratic South Korea, which is home to around 29,000 U.S. troops and 
marines51.  Daniel Sneider, the associate director for research at Stanford’s Asia-Pacific 
Research Center, summarizes his view of the situation by suggesting that, “For the 
Chinese, stability and the avoidance of war are the top priorities.  From that point of 
view, the North Koreans are a huge problem for them, because Pyongyang could trigger a 
war on its own”52.   
In addition to war, if the Chinese halt their support of North Korea in terms of 
economic or food aid, then they risk the collapse of the DPRK regime which would lead 
to hordes of refugees fleeing across the Chinese border and into northeastern China.  
And, as the Council on Foreign Relations notes, while the Chinese are still technically 
bound by the 1961 Sino-North Korean treaty to support the DPRK in case of a war, 
“China now places more value on national interest, over alliances blinded by ideology, 





but Chinese ambiguity deters others from taking military action against Pyongyang”53.  
This proves how much Beijing’s decisions can effect the progression or demise of the 
North Korean regime.  It also proves how China’s lack of a clear-cut direction, as it 
pertains to the DPRK, can severely constrain the actions and powers of the western-allied 
forces.   
While it is clear that China maintains significant leverage and influence over the 
DPRK, and can successfully convince North Korea to come to the bargaining table, 
China cannot control the DPRK’s actions once they arrive at the table, unless they are 
willing to risk toppling the entire regime.  Beijing’s dilemma remains a contentious 
debate, and most analysts will assert that China will avoid moves that could cause a 
sudden collapse of the regime54.  However, Andrew Scobell, an Asian military affairs 
expert, believes Beijing isn’t as predictable as most would assume.  He writes, “No action 
by China should be ruled out where North Korea is concerned”.  Scobell goes onto say 
that if China receives assurances that a unified Korea under Seoul would remain 
“favorably disposed” towards Beijing, then China would terminate its support and 
assistance of Pyongyang, and allow the DPRK to fail55.  These decisions that Beijing is 
currently grappling with all come down to whether or not North Korea will continue to 
develop and enhance their nuclear weapons program.   
In order to fully understand the vastly different theories regarding China’s 
approach to the North Korea situation, one must merely review the two extreme sides of 





the debate.  This clash of ideologies is called the “Hawk and Dove Perspective”56.  These 
two perspectives were created as a result of a disagreement between two professors.  The 
first professor is David Kang.  Dr. Kang is a professor of both International Relations, 
and Management & Organization at the University of Southern California’s Marshall 
School of Business.  The other professor is Victor Cha.  Dr. Cha is currently the director 
of the Asian Studies Department of Georgetown University.  It is because of these two 
professors that we are able to grasp onto the two different strategies that can be used 
when approaching North Korean politics.   
The “Hawk” perspective is the argument supported by Dr. Cha.  Within this 
strategy, Dr. Cha asserts that North Korea’s threats are not only real and dangerous, but 
also imminent.  Similarly, Dr. Cha also believes that the economic reform that the DPRK 
is allegedly striving towards is merely a tactic, and is not a genuine attempt at 
reformation.  Additionally, scholars who believe in the hawk perspective acknowledge 
the fact that North Korea has continually tried to grab the attention of the world, and 
relishes in any opportunity to become feared by the international community as it makes 
the regime, and its people, feel powerful.  As a result, North Korea is more than capable 
and willing to do something impulsive like launching a nuclear missile attack.  Because 
of this view, Dr. Cha and his hawk perspective would advocate for an aggressive and 
immediate act of violence in order to ensure that North Korea is not granted the luxury of 
freedom and time that could result in an even more deathly situation57. 
The other perspective in this debate is known as the “Dove” perspective.  The 
dove perspective is the strategy that is lobbied for by Dr. Kang.  Dr. Kang understands 




that North Korea is dangerous and should be reformed, but he doesn’t insist on 
immediate action or a military strike.  Rather, Dr. Kang and his peers believe in letting 
the North Korean regime run its course.  They believe that the DPRK will either reform 
by itself as the administration liberalizes, or it will slowly deteriorate and wither away.  
This theory exists because Dr. Kang, and his like-minded scholars, surmise that North 
Korea is not only not an immediate threat, but also the DPRK isn’t likely to launch a 
nuclear weapon or engage in terrorist activity.  These violent acts only seem possible 
because North Korea has consistently used a tactic called “deterrence” for the past 50 
years in order to evoke fear throughout the international community, and thus ensure that 
their country is not attacked58.  Additionally, even if North Korea would want to engage 
in a war with the US, China, or any other superpower, their large army wouldn’t be able 
to sufficiently attack or defend themselves due to the fact that their army has been 
underfunded and under trained for the past 30 years due to fiscal constraints.  Because of 
these assumptions, Dr. Kang and his dove perspective would promote a more passive 
approach to the DPRK, and would only support violent actions as a reaction rather than 
doing so immediately59. 
While these two theories are both plausible approaches to the DPRK and its’ 
dangerous nuclear activity, they are not absolute in practice.  Both Dr. Kang and Dr. Cha 
acknowledge this, and have revisited their arguments and augmented their theories.  
However, the premise of the Hawk vs. Dove perspective debate has remained relatively 
constant since the discussion was ignited.  Because of this, I would suggest that if Kim 
Jung Un decides to adhere to the U.N. sanctions and pleas from the western world, and 




begins to reign in its weapons program, Beijing should allow the two nations to return to 
its pre-established Sino-North Korean pact.  However, if this nuclear development 
persists, Beijing will undoubtedly be forced back into this precarious position, wedged 
directly between the west, which guarantees globalization, political reform, and economic 
prosperity, and the North Korean regime, which has been China’s most reliable ally since 
Kim Il Sung and Mao Zedong proliferated the same type of political ideology and 




 Since the Korean War, China and North Korea have been extremely close allies.  
At first, their shared political beliefs, coupled with their emphasis on self-reliance, 
brought the two countries together to drive out the imperialist forces of the United States, 
Japan and South Korea.  This “victory”, paired with the similarities and friendship that 
was shared between Mao Zedong and Kim Il Sung solidified the initial Sino-DPRK 
relationship.  However, as time has past since these events of the mid 1900s, both 
countries have progressed very differently.   
China has opened its borders in order to reform its economic landscape, and more 
recently, has begun to tackle political and human rights issues that will help strengthen its 
continental and global position.  Meanwhile, North Korea has flirted with opening its 
economic borders, but due to its stubbornness with regards to reforming any other aspects 
within their country such as their political system, educational support, and basic human 
rights laws, North Korea has been unable to match the amount of foreign capital that 
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China has been able to attract.  This economic failure, paired with the termination of 
Soviet assistance after the Cold War, has left North Korea isolated, poor, economically 
reliant on China, and forced to either concede to the pressures from the United Nations, 
or defend itself.  North Korea has chosen to ignore the United Nations, and instead, has 
further sequestered themselves by developing a nuclear weapons program that has 
triggered fear and strict sanctions from the western world.   
This last nuclear test has not only angered the United States, but it has pushed 
China into a position capable of dissolving the North Korean regime, or at least 
completely eliminating its nuclear program.  The question remains, will China risk the 
possibility of North Korea collapsing, refugees fleeing from the DPRK into China, and 
the Korean peninsula being unified by a U.S.-allied South Korea, all due to China cutting 
off trade and support to North Korea.  Or, will China continue to maintain its “lips to 
teeth” friendship between it and North Korea, continue to provide economic assistance, 
and ensure that there will always be a Chinese-controlled North Korea, even though this 
may lead to concerns over China’s credibility throughout the modern world.   
This question is yet to be answered fully, but if China’s recent reactions to North 
Korea’s nuclear tests have been any indication of the trend China is currently on with 
regards to its relationship with North Korea, I predict China will slowly discontinue its 
assistance and support of North Korea, especially as China gradually reforms its 
government and financial system to align itself with the other modern superpowers.  
Additionally, if North Korea refuses to cease development of its nuclear weapons 
program, I suggest China ally itself with the west, and fight to end the DPRK regime.  
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This will prove to be a smart investment in China’s future, and secure the trust and 
attention of the United States and the other developed superpowers for the years to come.   
I believe that Kim Il Sung’s proclamation that the “Korea-China friendship is an 
invincible one that no force can ever break.  It will further flourish down through 
generations.  It will last as long as the mountains and rivers to the two countries exist”60 
will inevitable prove false within the next few decades.  Even though the mountains and 
rivers may not change, the force that will certainly drive the relationship into the ground 
will be China’s divergence from the original zili gengsheng and juche political ideology, 
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